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INTRODUCTION

In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education and started the states rolling on the long and
torturous road to school desegregation. 1 The Brown Court has
been widely praised for striking down the fifty-eight year reign
of the "separate but equal" doctrine which the Court had
authored in Plessy v. Ferguson. 2 However, the analysis the
Court applied in Brown, and especially the implementation
decision, left much to be desired. 3 After hearing argument on
the Brown case for the third time, 4 the Court's only guidance on
how to desegregate the schools was to act reasonably and
"organize public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed ... "5 Such minimal guidance from the
Supreme Court has resulted in a confusing and uncertain
approach to desegregation in the lower federal and state courts.
While the Supreme Court has authorized a variety of
remedies for Equal Protection violations in the school desegrega1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The "separate but equal" doctrine was originally
applied by the Plessy court in the context of segregated railroad passenger cars, but
it quickly became the standard by which racial segregation in all contexts, including
public schools, was measured. In essence, the notion of"separate but equal" is that
it is not constitutionally impermissible to divide people according to their race so
long as the facilities provided for the separate races are substantially equal. In
application, "separate but equal" facilities, especially the public schools, had
continued to be separate, but rarely were equal.
3. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). After the
initial decision by the Supreme Court, striking down the "separate but equal"
doctrine, the case was remanded to the district court to fashion an appropriate
remedy. The case retumed to the Supreme Court a year later on the issue of how
to implement a program of desegregation in the public schools. This decision by the
Supreme Court is known as the implementation decision.
4. The implementation decision was, in fact, the third time the case had made
it to the Supreme Court. When the case first reached the Court they remanded for
additional fact finding without making a decision. It was the second time that the
case was before the Court that the famous decision, striking down Plessy v.
Ferguson, was made. The third time the case came before the Court was to decide
the issue of implementation as discussed above.
5. ld. at 301.
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tion context, the most useful, and most used, tool has been
busing. The courts first ordered busing in the South where there
was a history of purposeful and statutory discrimination. Then
busing orders extended to the North and West where there was
little or no history of purposeful or statutory discrimination.
Today, busing has become a familiar fact of life, especially in
large urban areas. In a few cases, the extent of busing has
become extreme, requiring bus rides of one hour or more for
children as young as five and six. 6
In some instances, busing remedies actually amplify rather
than alleviate the underlying causes of segregated schools. The
process typically begins when the courts impose a desegregation
order on a school district or group of school districts, cutting up
white, hispanic, asian or black neighborhoods and grouping them
into units with sections cut from neighborhoods of the other
races. Often the result is that parents with the economic means,
usually affluent whites, move to more remote suburbs or enroll
their children in private schools to avoid busing. Over time the
diminishing number of white children in the school throws off
the racial balance and the entire process must be repeated. Each
time this occurs school boards and courts are forced to extend the
reach of busing even further to find the proper balance of races.
As the scope of busing has expanded, local school boards and
neighborhood organizations have increasingly taken their
petitions for "neighborhood schools" to the courts in an attempt
to limit the expansive reach of the busing remedy. The basis for
such actions is that busing has achieved its purpose and
outgrown its usefulness. These groups have argued that the
purpose for busing school children is to eliminate purposeful
discrimination rather than to achieve precise racial parity in all
public schools, and that where purposeful discrimination on the
basis of race has been eliminated busing is no longer necessary. 7
However, even where the segregation of the races in the schools
seems no longer to be purposeful, these efforts have met with
considerable difficulty.

6. The author is personally familiar with circumstances in the greater Los
Angeles area where children of all ages, beginning in Kindergarten, are bused from
a remote, predominately white, suburban area into an inner city school to achieve
racial balancing. The moming ride through rush hour traffic can be over an hour.
While this may be one of the more extreme cases, it is certainly not an anomaly.
7. See e.g., Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Washington
v. Seattle School Dis. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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The following sections discuss two apparently conflicting
approaches the Supreme Court has taken with respect to antibusing efforts at the Congressional and state levels and examine
how they can be reconciled with each other.

II.

IMPLEMENTATION OF BROWN AND THE BUSING REMEDY

Early efforts to enforce Brown met with strong resistance in
the South. The Supreme Court, however, left the enforcement of
the desegregation requirement primarily to the lower courts and
the political arena for several years after the Brown implementation decision in 1955. When the Supreme Court did address the
issue of enforcing desegregation, it took a firm stance that
upheld the validity of Brown. 8
The Supreme Court's first major re-entry to school desegregation occurred thirteen years after Brown in Green v. County
School Board. 9 In Green the Court dealt squarely with the issue
of whether Equal Protection required only the elimination of
purposeful segregation or mandated affirmative efforts to
integrate the public schools. 10 By this time, many Southern
school districts had adopted "freedom of choice" plans whereby
students and parents were free to choose which schools within
the district they would attend. These plans, however, resulted
in very little movement of blacks into white schools and almost
no movement of whites into black schools. 11
The Court's emphasis then shifted from eliminating purposeful discrimination to achieving actual integration. Because the
"freedom of choice" plans were not achieving the desired level of
integration, the Court found such plans to be inadequate. In
Green the Court said, "[t]he burden on a school board today is to
come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and

8. Two examples of this are Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and Griffin
v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Cooper all
nine Justices reaffirmed the validity of Brown in the face of opposition to
desegregation by Governor Faubus and the State of Arkansas. In Griffin, the
county instituted a plan to avoid desegregation whereby all the public schools in the
county were closed, and white school children were given grants of public funds to
pay their tuition at all-white private schools. The Court found the legislation
unconstitutional, reasoning that the only possible reason for the closing of the public
schools was to ensure that white children would not, under any circumstances, be
compelled to go to the same schools as black children in the county.
9. 391 u.s. 430 (1968).
10. Id. at 432.
11. Id. at 441.
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promises realistically to work now. "12
In evaluating the
effectiveness of "freedom of choice" plans the Court stated:
Although the general experience under "freedom of choice" to
date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of
desegregation, there may well be instances in which it can
serve as an effective device . . . [But] if there are reasonably
available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising
speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial
school system, "freedom of choice" must be held unacceptable.13

I
I
i

II
I

The emphasis in Green on effects rather than purposes laid the
foundation for the whole-scale integration orders that were to
flow from the federal courts over the next twenty years.
The method most often used by the federal and state courts
to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate was to carve up
neighborhoods on the basis of race and assign the correct number
of sections to the various public schools, insuring that the racial
balance of each school in the system reflected the racial balance
of the district as a whole. Achieving this kind of balance can
often require taking sections from widely separated neighborhoods and assigning them to a single school. Such a process
relies heavily on racial quotas.
While the Supreme Court has continued to reject the strict
application of ratios or quotas to school desegregation, it has
approved of ratios as a starting point for developing an integration plan. 14 The danger inherent in such a position is that by
starting with quotas, the end result is seldom more than quotas. 15
Two questions now arise. First, if there really is no legal
mandate on the state or local level causing the racial imbalance

12. ld. at 439 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 440-41.
14. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
15. While some people feel that strict quotas are the only workable solution to
segregated schools, such an approach looks past the underlying purposes of school
desegregation. The popular moral that led to the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown was the belief that it was improper to separate school children based solely
on their race. Quotas succeed in racially integrating the schools, but they rely on
the same fallacy which the Brown decision sought to remedy. The school which a
child will attend is still determined by his race. Ideally, a system of integration
should not consider race at all. In operation, however, quotas are easy to
administer and provide results. The problem of balancing results with analytical
purity is a difficult one and goes beyond just the school desegregation context,
reaching into all forms of affirmative action.
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in the schools, and there is no showing of intent on the part of
the school board to segregate the schools based on race, is
integration still compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment simply
on the grounds that different neighborhoods in the school district
are primarily black or white? And second, after a court order
requiring integration of a school system through busing is
entered, when, if ever, is the problem of purposeful segregation
sufficiently remedied as to allow the removal of federal court
jurisdiction and a return to neighborhood schools? These
questions have been posed increasingly over the years as efforts
to limit the scope of busing have multiplied.
The remaining sections will examine the efforts of Congress,
state and local governments and private citizens to curb busing
in the public school systems. The contention of those who
support a reduction in busing is that the point of Brown was to
eliminate the invidious separation of school children on the basis
ofrace, not to compel precise racial balances in all public schools.
In many school districts, racial discrimination seems to have
been largely eradicated, at least on the official government or
school board level, and the continued busing may be doing more
harm than good. 16
III.

CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB BUSING

In the wake of extensive busing remedies mandated by the
federal courts came efforts by Congress to limit busing in public
schools. Relying on Congressional power in Art. III and§ 5 of
the 14th Amendment, several acts have been proposed that
would limit the busing of school children.
The Education Amendments of 1974 set up a hierarchy of
remedies for the federal courts to employ in affecting desegrega-

16. It is important to point out here that this position is not accepted by many
who have analyzed the problem of school desegregation. Paul R. Dimond, in his
book, BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985),
takes an opposing view. He sees the efforts to curb busing in public school districts
as unwarranted and premature. His focus is on the Supreme Court's continued
refusal to consider the actions of government institutions (local, state, and federal)
other than school boards in promoting segregated residential areas through a wide
variety of discriminatory practices. Dimond contends that government action is
often behind the problem of racially segregated neighborhoods, and thus, the racial
imbalance that continues to exist in many schools can't be dismissed as a simple
function of geography rather than purposeful discrimination. Dimond advocates the
continued use of busing to integrate the schools and other measures to get at
government action that purposefully discriminates on the basis of race beyond the
school boards themselves.
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tion. 17 Praising the virtue of neighborhood schools, the Act
limited the use ofbusing by forbidding "the transportation of any
student to a school other than the school closest or next closest
to his place of residence." 18 Fearing that the Act might not
withstand constitutional review, however, an important proviso
was also added, stating that the provisions of the Act were "not
intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the
United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments."19 This proviso significantly limited any bite that the
Act might otherwise have had in limiting the extensive busing
orders that continued to flow from the courts.
The efforts to use Congressional power to curb busing
remedies continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1981,
Senator Johnston of Louisiana proposed the Neighborhood School
Act, which would have allowed busing as a remedy to school
segregation cases only in very narrowly defined circumstances.
While the proposal was adopted by the Senate, it met with
opposition in the House and was never acted upon.
Many laws and constitutional amendments have been
proposed in Congress almost annually, especially during the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, which took a clear antibusing stance and sought to restrict federal court power to order
busing. However, these efforts have proved unsuccessful to date.

IV. STATE EFFORTS TO CURB BUSING
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided two cases concerning the
constitutionality of state efforts to curb mandatory busing
programs that the states had previously imposed upon themselves in order to remedy racial segregation in their schools. The
state action in Washington u. Seattle School District No. 120 was
found unconstitutional while the state action in Crawford u.
Board of Education 21 was sustained. The holdings are difficult
to reconcile with each other, but a closer look at the Court's
reasoning is insightful into the modern Court's stance on antibusing measures.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1706-18 (1974).
ld. at § 215(a).
ld. at § 203(b).
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1

The Washington case was appealed to the Supreme Court to
decide the constitutionality of a state initiative that provided
that "no school board [shall] directly or indirectly require any
student to attend a school other than the school which is
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of
residence [and] which offers the course of study pursued by such
student."22 This state law was passed in response to a plan by
the city of Seattle for mandatory busing to eliminate racial
imbalance in the city's schools.
The five vote majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun,
held that the state initiative was unconstitutional. Blackmun
concluded that the initiative "must fall because it does not
attempt to allocate governmental power on the basis of any
general principle. [Instead, it uses] the racial nature of an issue
to define the governmental decision-making structure, thus
imposing substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities."23 The state's argument that the initiative had no racial
overtones was rejected by Blackmun, who called this an explicit
use of race. 24
The Court emphasized that the practical effect of the
initiative was to reallocate the power over student assignment
from the local school boards to the state level. This kind of
reallocation had been held to be unconstitutional in Hunter v.
Erickson, 25 and Blackmun relied heavily on that case. Blackmun did concede that "the simple repeal or modification of
desegregation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never
has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial
classification."26 But he saw the Washington statute as doing
something more than a "simple repeal."
B.

Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education

In Crawford, Justice Powell, who had written for the dissent
in Washington, wrote the majority opinion. Here, the Court
upheld a California constitutional amendment designed to limit

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Washington, 458 U.S. at 462.

Id. at 458.
Id. at 470.

393 u.s. 385 (1969).
Washington, 458 U.S. at 483 (quoting Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539).
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the power of the state courts under the state constitution to
order busing remedies. Previously, the state courts had used the
California constitution to provide even more extensive busing
remedies than would be required under federal Equal Protection.
Now the state legislature sought to limit the state courts to only
those remedies that would be required in the federal system.
Addressing the same issue as in Washington, Powell
concluded that the amendment did not employ an explicit racial
classification or impose a race specific burden on minorities. 27
Thus, the discriminatory purpose required for an Equal Protection violation was not present. The benefits of neighborhood
schools that the amendment sought to confer were available to
all, regardless of race. This is especially important considering
that white students were actually a minority in the Los Angeles
District. Powell concluded that, "the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more,
never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid
racial classification."28
C.

Distinguishing Washington from Crawford

Don't these two cases, decided at the same time, have
opposite holdings? Both cases deal with the efforts of local
citizens to cut back on extensive busing remedies where it
appeared that there was no longer any explicit or purposeful
discrimination on the part of the school boards. Yet one was
rejected while the other was upheld. On what grounds can they
be distinguished?
Blackmun makes an earnest effort to distinguish the two
cases on the fact that Washington was taking the control over
student assignment out of its traditional resting place, the local
school board; but isn't that what happens every time the federal
courts step in to mandate integration of the schools by busing?
And wasn't the initiative in Washington designed to set limits on
the remedies school boards could use for integrating their schools
rather than taking away their power to assign students to the
appropriate school?
The only plausible distinction between the two cases seems
to be a relatively insignificant one: where the state seeks to cut
back on the local school boards' efforts to integrate through

27. Id. at 531.
28. Id. at 539.
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extensive busing there is an Equal Protection violation, but
where the local school boards themselves seek to cut back on the
busing remedies they have applied in the past there is no
constitutional violation. Perhaps underlying all of this is the
Supreme Court's concern that if Crawford, were held to be
unconstitutional we might have reached a point of no return.
The desegregation orders were originally implemented to
eradicate purposeful discrimination.
Once the purposeful
discrimination has been removed, is there still a need for the
extensive busing of school children to achieve racial balancing?
If the answer to this question had been "yes" in Crawford it
would be hard to conceive of any scenario where the answer
would be "no."

V.

CONCLUSION

The debate over whether busing continues to serve its
purpose and whether traditional busing remedies are doing more
harm than good remains unresolved. The Supreme Court has
left itself considerable room on the issue in deciding future cases
that are sure to arise. Depending on whether the Court chooses
to characterize the facts of any particular case as more analogous
to Washington or Crawford, future anti-busing efforts could
make progress or be stymied. There are also several new
Justices on the Court since the time of the Washington and
Crawford cases whose stance on this issue is uncertain.
Another important feature of this continuing debate is likely
to come to the front in the near future. The new Republican
majority that swept into Congress in the 1994 elections is likely
to make some efforts on the legislative front to curb busing. But
even if such legislation is passed, it will undoubtedly meet with
constitutional challenges in the courts. While the future of
busing in America remains uncertain, the debate is likely to
increase rather than abate in intensity.
Keith Woodwell

